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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 





Appearances: Nora Carroll, Esq. 
The Legal Aid Society 
111 Livingston Street, 10th Floor 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
12-125-18 B 
Decision appealed: December 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 
months. 
Boa:rd Member(s) Drake, Berliner, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received March 19, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statemen~ of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
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Commissioner 
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/~ ~-Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate fipdings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ¢_51't:ff &' . 
Distribution:- Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
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Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life upon his conviction of two counts of Murder.  
In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board denying 
release and imposing a 15-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the Board’s decision is 
irrational because the Board failed to balance the statutory factors; (2) the Board erroneously and 
unfairly characterized Appellant’s interview responses as having “vacillated” and lacked detail; 
(3) the Board relied exclusively and unlawfully on the instant offense to the exclusion of the 
reasoning in prior Board decisions; (4) the Board’s reliance on the instant offense is irrational in 
light of the release of Appellant’s co-defendant; (5) the decision is not guided by risk and need 
principles and fails to provide a legitimate explanation for departing from the COMPAS 
instrument; (6) the Board failed to take into account Appellant’s youth at the time of the instant 
offense; and (7) Appellant should be released on parole or, alternatively, granted a de novo 
interview.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider factors that are relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner 
is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990). 
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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: Appellant’s background, involvement in the Black Panthers and 
the Black Liberation Army, and related political views; the instant offense involving the in concert 
shooting deaths of two police officers; Appellant’s criminal history in California; his institutional 
record including educational accomplishments, program completions, initiatives such as the Men’s 
Council, teaching, and discipline; his expressions of remorse; his physical health; and release plans 
including residence with two friends or, alternatively, his mother out-of-state.  The Board also had 
before it and considered, among other things, the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing 
minutes, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, opposition to release, and Appellant’s 
parole packet and letters of support, including from one victim’s son. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the serious nature of the instant offense, 
and Appellant’s motivation, involving the murder of two law enforcement officers as representatives 
of the State in a self-proclaimed war, the harm Appellant caused, and that, despite professing 
responsibility during the interview, Appellant was not forthcoming about and distanced himself from 
the crime insofar as he was vague about what happened and vacillated between not remembering his 
actions, remembering one shooting and not the other, denying the second shooting and then not 
recalling it.  See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 
1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 
233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 
2004); Matter of Carrion v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 403, 404, 620 N.Y.S.2d 
420, 421 (2d Dept. 1994). 
 
Appellant claims the Board failed to engage in required balancing of the statutory factors or 
explain it sufficiently in its decision.  He argues the dissent, in contrast, properly weighed the factors 
by using “language of balance” in reference to the offense considered in context.  While the majority 
used this so-called “language of balance” in reference to specific factors, there is no legal 
requirement that the Board use the word “balance” and Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption 
that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of McKee, 157 A.D.2d at 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 205; see 
also People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); 
People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 
959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board also is not required to articulate the weight accorded to each 
factor, Matter of Allis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1309, 1309, 890 N.Y.S.2d 
200, 201 (3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 946, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157, 
158 (2d Dept. 2009), or even explicitly mention each factor considered, Matter of Betancourt, 148 
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A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315; Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 
1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  The Board’s written decision is governed by Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d).  The decision satisfies the criteria set forth therein, 
as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 
2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005).  The Board 
addressed applicable factors and principles in individualized terms and explained those that 
ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations—including the serious murder offense 
targeting law enforcement officers as representatives of the State and Appellant’s vague and 
inconsistent interview responses concerning the crime.  Courts regularly sustain parole decisions 
with substantially less particularized explanations than presented here.  See, e.g., Matter of Siao-
Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008), aff’g 51 A.D.3d 105, 110, 854 
N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept.) (citing decision); Matter of Kozlowski, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 
87, rev’g 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 30265(U), 2013 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 552 (citing decision); see also 
Matter of Garcia, 239 A.D.2d at 237, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 417. 
 
Appellant argues the Board erroneously and unfairly characterized his interview responses 
as having “vacillated” and lacked detail.  He also contends the decision is vague, confusing, and 
disconnected from the law.  The pre-sentence investigation report, on which the Board is entitled 
to rely, Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 16 
N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011), reflects that Appellant shot both officers.  Appellant’s 
written personal statement in his parole packet – which makes brief mention of what occurred during 
the crime – also acknowledges he shot both officers.   
  However, his interview responses 
about what transpired – which were similarly limited in detail – were internally inconsistent and 
contradicted by the official record.  (Tr. at 37-38, 51-52.)  The interview transcript supports the 
Board’s characterization of his responses.  While Appellant contends his responses were consistent 
with an in-concert crime, the inquiry and responses characterized as “vacillat[ing]” clearly concerned 
Appellant’s actions in particular, namely, whether or not he personally fired shots at both officers as 
indicated in the official record.  (Tr. at 51-52.)  And while Appellant expressed responsibility for the 
crime, the Board has the authority to make credibility determinations, Matter of Siao-Pao v. 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 
N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008), and rationally concluded he was not being forthcoming and was distancing 
himself from the crime.  His inability or unwillingness to fully acknowledge his crime is relevant to 
both his rehabilitative progress and whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense so 
as to undermine respect for the law.  See Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704; 
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007).  The 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Bottom, Anthony DIN: 77-A-4283  
Facility: Sullivan CF AC No.:  12-125-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 4 of 7) 
 
decision also was sufficiently clear and detailed to inform Appellant of the reasons for the parole 
denial, as discussed above. 
 
Appellant argues the Board relied exclusively and unlawfully on the instant offense to the 
exclusion of reasoning given in prior decisions.  As the weight to be assigned each statutory factor 
is within its discretion, the Board may emphasize the severity of the offense over the other factors 
considered.  See, e.g., Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 
846 (3d Dept. 2014), aff’d 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 
51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept. 2008), aff'd 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 
(2008); Matter of Kirkpatrick, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540; Matter of Carrion, 210 A.D.2d at 
404, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 421.  The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of 
Mullins, 136 A.D.3d at 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698.  That the Board found Appellant’s postconviction 
activities outweighed by the serious nature of his crime, together with its impact and his interview 
responses, does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter 
of McLain, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629, or render the decision irrational, see Matter of 
Garcia, 239 A.D.2d at 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 418.  The record of past parole denials also does 
not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider the applicable factors or render 
the decision irrational as there is no legal requirement that a second Board panel must follow the 
recommendation of a prior Board panel.  See Matter of Flores v New York State Bd. of Parole, 
210 A.D.2d 555, 620 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (3d Dept. 1994).  Variation from earlier decisions “shows 
only that [the Board] considered the factors anew.”  Matter of Phillips, 41 A.D.3d at 21, 834 
N.Y.S.2d at 124.   
 
The inmate’s positive institutional efforts do not automatically entitle him to release, as 
discretionary release shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Gutkaiss v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 50 A.D.3d 1418, 857 N.Y.S.2d 755 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Faison 
v. Travis, 260 A.D.2d 866, 688 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 1013, 
697 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1999).  The Board did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it 
denied parole on the ground that the seriousness of the crime, together with the harm caused and 
Appellant’s interview responses, were not outweighed by his accomplishments, release plans and 
letters of support, including from the son of one victim.  Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 
A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board did not act arbitrarily in denying parole 
on the ground that serious crimes were not outweighed by other factors such as an exemplary 
institutional record and many letters of support including a letter from the victim’s mother); see 
also Matter of Anthony v. New York State Div. of Parole, 17 A.D.3d 301, 301, 792 N.Y.S.2d 900, 
900 (1st Dept. 2005) (citation omitted), lv. denied, 5 N.Y.3d 708, 803 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2005); Matter of 
Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 
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2002); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 266 A.D.2d 296, 297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999), 
aff’d 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). 
 
 Appellant asserts that the Board’s reliance on the instant offense is irrational in light of a 
co-defendant’s release.  However, the parole status of a co-defendant from the underlying criminal 
transaction is irrelevant.  Each application for parole release is to be considered on its own individual 
merits.   Baker v. McCall, 543 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982); 
see also Matter of Phillips, 41 A.D.3d at 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 124-25 (“There is no entitlement to 
parole based upon comparison with the particulars of other applicants.  Rather, each case is sui 
generis, and the Board has full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted 
value.”).  Here, the Board reviewed the record, conducted a thorough interview and deliberated with 
a majority of the panel ultimately deciding to deny parole release.  Its decision was based not only 
upon the instant offense and the harm caused but also upon Appellant’s interview responses.  
Appellant’s suggestion that the Board was swayed by media attention and officials’ criticism is purely 
speculative and unsubstantiated.  Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 
N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber 
v. Travis, 264 A.D.2d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 1999).  This is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo, 294 A.D.2d at 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703; People ex. rel. Johnson, 180 A.D.2d at 
916, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 959.   
 
Appellant’s apparent contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
to the Executive Law and the Board’s regulations is likewise without merit.  The 2011 amendments 
require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole 
release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by 
using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 
866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 
N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to 
be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety 
of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did 
not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by 
considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not 
change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether 
to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, 
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the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).   
 
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the regulations do not require the COMPAS be given more 
weight but rather require the Board to consider risk and needs principles, including the COMPAS 
scores, and provide an explanation if a denial decision is impacted by a departure from any 
COMPAS scale.  In the matter at hand, the Board considered the COMPAS instrument and explained 
why, despite low scores, it was nonetheless denying release.  In so doing, it was not expressing 
disagreement with any particular scale and nothing in its written decision contradicted the COMPAS 
instrument.  Rather, the Board concluded that Appellant’s COMPAS instrument was outweighed by 
other considerations indicating that, despite scores that suggested a low risk of recidivism relative to 
the incarcerated population as a whole, release would be contrary to the welfare of society and would 
undermine respect for the law.  As such, it committed no error by addressing the overall COMPAS.   
 
Moreover, there is no merit to Appellant’s contention that the instant offense, or an inmate’s 
present attitude towards it, can never be the basis for a COMPAS departure.  Even assuming, 
arguendo, that this is what occurred, nothing in the relevant statutes and regulations indicates that a 
failure to appreciate the scope of harm one has caused is irrelevant to the considerations addressed by 
the COMPAS instrument.  Similarly, the suggestion that the Board can never place more weight on 
the instant offense, including where the Board relies on the second and third statutory standards, is 
incorrect.  See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d at 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 871; see also 
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
Insofar as Appellant objects that the Board failed to take into account his youth at the time 
of the instant offense, the Board was not required to treat his age (19 y.o.) as a mitigating factor.  
The Board is required to consider an inmate’s youth in relation to the commission of an offense 
for which he is serving a maximum life sentence pursuant to the Third Department’s decision in 
Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 39, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016), and the Board’s amended regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§ 8002.2(c).  However, this requirement does not apply whereas here the inmate was an adult when 
he committed the offense.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(c) (defining “minor offenders” as inmates 
serving a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a crime committed prior to the individual 
attaining the age of 18 years of age); Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 
915 (3d Dept. 2017) (Hawkins inapplicable to offender who was over 18 at time of offense); cf. 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding unconstitutional mandatory life 
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imprisonment without parole for juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (distinguishing juveniles under 18 from adults).  Nothing 
in the Executive Law or current case law supports expanding minor offender consideration to 
adults.  It also is far from clear that Appellant’s criminal behavior reflects “transient immaturity.”  
Matter of Hawkins, 140 A.D.3d at 36, 30 N.Y.S.3d at 398.  We nonetheless note the interview 
transcript reflects the Board considered Appellant’s age, circumstances and subsequent development 
while incarcerated.  The Board also had before it and considered the official statements by Appellant’s 
trial attorneys and other material in his packet that addressed his age and circumstances. 
 
As for Appellant’s claim seeking release, we note that the proper remedy for a successful 
challenge to a parole release decision is a de novo interview.  Matter of Quartararo v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 224 A.D.2d 266, 637 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 805, 646 
N.Y.S.2d 984 (1996); accord Matter of Ifill v. Evans, 87 A.D.3d 776, 928 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dept. 
2011); Matter of Lichtel v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 837, 731 N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dept. 2001). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
